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BACKGROUND

During patent infringement litigation, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("FRCP") and the federal district court's local rules govern
the parties' pretrial discovery and motion practice.1 The U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California has adopted the most
comprehensive local rules to date covering pretrial procedures in the
patent litigation context.2 The Northern District of California Patent
Local Rules ("Local Rules")3 may come to have a significant impact
throughout the federal courts, as it appears that other jurisdictions and
commentators are looking to the Local Rules for guidance. For in
stance, the American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994) ("[A]ll courts established by Act of Congress may from time
to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business."); FED. R. Clv. P. 83(a)(l) ("Each
district court, acting by a majority of its district judges, may, after giving appropriate public
notice and an opportunity for comment, make and amend rules governing its practice.").
2. Clifton .E. McCann, Markman

-

Claim Interpretation, 1998-99' AB.A.

Preferred Procedures to Promote Certainty of Patent
PROP. L. ANN. R. 292, available at

SEC. lNTELL.

http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/98-99report/601.html.
3. N. D. Cal. Patent Local R. (Jan. 1, 2001) [hereinafter "N.D. Cal. L.R."], available at
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov.
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Law ("ABA/IPL") closely examined the Local Rules, found them to
have considerable merit, and appeared to use an early version of the
rules as a basis for the ABA/IPL 1999 proposed resolutions governing
patent claim construction practice and procedure.4 Federal courts in
several other districts have occasionally cited the Local Rules in their
opinions and have been willing to use the Local Rules as a guide in
developing their own patent infringement litigation procedures.5 In
order to understand how the Local Rules affect the patent litigation
process, a short review of patent law is necessary.
The Constitution grants Congress the power to promote the prog
ress of the useful arts by giving inventors the exclusive right to their
discoveries for limited times.6 In other words, Congress may induce
inventors to disclose their creations by providing them with a limited
monopoly right. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO")
issues patents that vest such a legal monopoly in the patentee by
granting the right to preclude others from making,. using, selling, of
fering to sell, or importing the patented invention.7 The patent's sub
ject matter is set forth in the specification, which contains the written
description of the invention and the patent "claims."8 The claims are
the legal language that defines the metes and bounds of the patentee's
monopoly right,9 while the written description explains the invention
and provides the context for the terms used in the claim language.10

4. See McCann, supra note 2, at 288-90 (showing voting outcomes in favor of Proposed
Resolutions 601-1 to 601-7).
5. See, e.g., Thomson Consumer Elecs., Inc. v. Innovatron, S.A., 43 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29 n.1
(D.D.C. 1999) (citing N.D. Cal. LR in discussion of Markman hearing procedures); Preci
sion Shooting Equip. Inc. v. High Country Archery, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1042 (D. Ariz. 1998)
("This Court utilized the [N.D. Cal. LR] as a guide for this Order. . ."); see also Kenneth R
Adamo, Get on Your Marks, Get Set, Go; Or "And Just How Are We Going to Effect
Markman Construction in This Matter, Counsel?", in How TO PREPARE & CONDUCT
MARKMAN Hearings, at 602, 608 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary Prep.
Course, Handbook Series No. 665, 2001) (stating that the· N.D. Cal. LR have the "best
known" patent litigation practice procedures and have been "used or adopted" by other dis
tricts and individual judges including Judge Ward in the Eastern District of Texas).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8.
7. 35 u.s.c. § 271 (1994).
8. The specification must also include the manner and process of making and using the
invention as well as the inventor's best mode of carrying out the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 1 12
(1994).
9. The U.S. patent system is based on the peripheral claiming technique in which the
claims mark out the periphery of the area covered by the patent. Only devices or processes
that lie within that area infringe the patent. See Ex parte Fressola, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1608, 1610
(B.N.A.) (Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f 1993) ("Modern claim interpretation is based on the periph
eral system where the scope of the .claim is not expanded."); Renishaw PLC v. Marposs
Societa Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
10. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1 995)
(en bane), atfd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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The claims of a patent may vary in scope. Broad claims contain
fewer limitations, or "elements,"11 than narrow claims and thus de
scribe, or "read on,"12 a wider range of subject matter.13 It is usually
beneficial for the patentee to have a patent with broad claims in order
to reach as many potential competitors as possible, and to prevent
competitors from "designing around" the patent by examining the
claim language and then purposefully designing a device that avoids
infringement by substituting or removing claim elements.14 Con
versely, if the patentee drafts the claims too broadly they may be inva
lid in view of the "prior art" - previously existing innovations that
either are already the subject of a previously issued patent or are oth
erwise part of the public knowledge.15 Claims that are apparent given
the public knowledge of the state of the art are invalid because the
claimed invention is obvious, while claims that read directly on the
prior art are invalid because the claimed invention lacks novelty.16
A patentee17 seeking to enforce its limited monopoly may initiate a
suit alleging that an adverse party improperly infringed its patent.18
Patent litigation normally begins when a patent claimant files a patent
infringement complaint in a U.S. Federal District Court.19 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction for
appeals of district court judgments decided under the federal patent
laws.20

11. For patented processes, the claim elements define steps or acts to be performed. For
patented products, the claim elements define discrete physical structures or materials. U.S.
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE§ 2106
(II)(C) [hereinafter MPEP).
12. A claim reads on a particular device if that device contains all of the claim elements.
13.

HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE

14.

ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON THE MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING

12 (2d ed. 1995).

VII. Claims of Varying Scope § 60 (Practicing Law Institute 2000); id. X Thoughts on Writ
ing a Claim.

15. Id. X.
16. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1994). An invention is obvious if the differences
between the invention and the prior art are such that the invention would have been obvious
to a person of ordinary skill in the relevant industry. An invention is anticipated, and there
fore lacks novelty, if a single piece of prior art contains all the essential elements of the in
vention. Hybritech, Inc., v. Monoclonal Antibodies Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
17. This Note uses the terms "patentee" and "patent claimant" interchangeably. The
former refers to a party who received a patent from the PTO, whereas the latter refers to a
party, usually a patentee or an exclusive licensee with standing to sue, claiming patent in
fringement.
18. 35 u.s.c.§ 271 (1994).
19. See 28 U.S.C.§ 1338 (1994).
20. 28 U.S.C.§§ 1292(c)(2), 1295(a)(l) (1994).

December 2001]

Improper Patent Use

643

Courts tend to perform patent infringement analysis in two
stages.21 In the first stage, the court construes, or interprets,22 the claim
language. Claim construction entails clarifying the technical terms,
terms of art, special term usages, and ambiguous terms in the claims23
as well as determining the scope of those terms.24 When construing
claims, the court can neither broaden nor narrow the claim scope to
give the patentee something different than what the patent set forth.25
In essence, claim construction is the process of elaborating terse lan
guage in order to understand and explain it, but not to change its
scope.26
As parties propose a claim construction to the court, they may
buttress their position by relying on two types of evidence - intrinsic
and extrinsic.27 In the jargon of patent litigation, "intrinsic evidence"
consists of only the claims, specification, and prosecution history28 of

21. Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting
Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating
that a patent infringement analysis requires two steps: " 'First, the claim must be properly
construed to determine its scope and meaning. Second, the claim as properly construed must
be compared to the accused device or process.' ").
22. This Note uses the terms "claim construction" and "claim interpretation" inter
changeably to refer to the combined process of determining both claim meaning and scope.
It may be proper, in some instances, to use the word "interpret" when speaking of the
meaning of the words and "construe" in connection with determining protection beyond the
words, i.e., the scope of a claim. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62
F.3d 1512, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane), affd, 517 U.S. 370
(1996). There may also be a temporal distinction between the terms. Claim interpretation,
the process performed by the PTO when reviewing a patent application, gives claims their
broadest scope. See, e.g. , In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (C.C.P.A. 1969). In compari
son, claim construction, the process performed by the court and the parties during an in
fringement action, gives claims the narrowest scope that the patent and its associated prose
cution history will allow.
23. Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
24. Tanabe Seiyaku Co., Ltd. v. United States Int'I Trade Comm'n, 109 F.3d 726, 731
(Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1027 (1997) ("[W]e construe the claim asserted to be
infringed to determine its meaning and scope.").
25. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States ITC, 988 F.2d 1 165, 1 171 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
26. Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Nintendo Co. Ltd, 30 USPQ.2d 1657, 1659 (W.D.
Wash. 1994), affd, 39 F.3d 1 197 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (unpublished decision).
27. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
("The intrinsic evidence, and, in some cases, the extrinsic evidence, can shed light on the
meaning of the terms recited in a claim. . . ").
28. The prosecution history contains the complete record of all the proceedings before
the Patent and Trademark Office as an inventor applied for a patent. See Standard Oil Co. v.
Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[T]he prosecution history (some
times called 'file wrapper and contents') of the patent consists of the entire record of pro
ceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office. This includes all express representations made
by or on behalf of the applicant to the examiner to induce a patent grant. . . . Such represen
tations include amendments to the claims and arguments made to convince the examiner
that the claimed invention meets the statutory requirements of novelty, utility, and nonobvi
ousness. Thus, the prosecution history (or file wrapper) limits the interpretation of claims
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the patent in suit.29 Any other evidence referenced during claim con
struction is termed "extrinsic evidence" and may include, inter alia,
expert testimony, inventor testimony, technical dictionaries, technical
treatises and articles, and information related to the allegedly infring
ing device or process.30 Once claim construction is complete, the scope
attributed to the claims operates to limit the patent claimant's rights in
the remaining litigation.31
In the second stage of infringement analysis, claim application, the
court determines whether any of the claims as construed read on the
accused instrumentality32 either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents.33 Generally, literal infringement occurs only if each and
every claim element is present in the accused instrumentality.34 Con
versely, if one or more claim elements are missing, there is no literal
infringement.35 The doctrine of equivalents allows a court to find in
fringement when someone copies the heart of a:n invention but avoids
the literal claim language by making a trivial change in the design of
an accused instrumentality.36 This doctrine allows the patentee a
broader right to exclude than what the literal claim language provides.
For example, assume a patent specification includes element A in one
claim describing the invention. Subsequently, a competitor attempts to
design around the patent by producing a competing product that fully
embodies the patent claim except that the competitor replaces ele
ment A with an alternative - element B. There is no literal infringe
ment of that patent claim because the competing product does not
include each and every claim element, but the doctrine of equivalents
allows a court to find infringement by ruling that element B is equiva
lent to element A. Thus, in creating a realm of protection for its inven
tion, the patentee's first bite at the apple is in its drafting of the literal
claim language. The doctrine of equivalents is simply a second bite at

[during litigation] so as to exclude any interpretation that may have been disclaimed or dis
avowed during prosecution in order to obtain claim allowance.").
29. SA DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03(2][e][ii] (2001).
30. Id. § 18.03[2][e][i]. This Note asserts that, during claim construction, it is not proper
to reference the information relating to the allegedly infringing device or process for any
reason other than to determine which claim terms are in issue. See infra note 75 and accom
panying text.
31. Id. § 18.03[4].
32. This Note uses the term "accused instrumentality" to refer to the device or process
that the patent claimant alleges is infringing the patent in suit.
33. CHISUM, supra note 29, § 18.01.
34. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 81. '
35. See, e.g., Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
36. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 82.
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the apple as the patentee attempts to prove infringement in a court of
law.37
Despite this expansive effect, the doctrine of equivalents techni
cally does not broaden the scope of patent claims; rather it expands
the patentee's right to exclude. As the Federal Circuit explained in
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates:
This court on occasion has characterized claims as being "expanded " or
"broadened" under the doctrine of equivalents. Precisely speaking, these
characterizations are inaccurate. To say that the doctrine of equivalents
extends or enlarges the claims is a contradiction in terms. The claims i.e., the scope of patent protection as defined by the claims - remain the
same and application of the doctrine expands the right to exclude to
"equivalents" of what is claimed. The doctrine of equivalents, by defini
tion, involves going beyond any permissible interpretation of the claim
language; i.e., it involves determining whether the accused product is
"equivalent" to what is described by the claim language.38

Three conclusions should be clear from the Wilson Sporting Goods
analysis. First, the procedural timing of the doctrine of equivalents during the claim application stage of infringement analysis rather than
the claim construction stage - precludes a court from expanding the
literal claim scope. Second, the proper method for a court to expand
the patent monopoly right to include an accused instrumentality that
does not literally infringe is through an application of the doctrine of
equivalents, not through an expansion of the literal claim scope. Fi
nally, the literal claim language limits the doctrine of equivalents be
cause elements in the accused instrumentality must be the equivalent
of elements literally claimed.39

37. See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts v. Cardinal Indus., 145 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) ("There is no policy-based reason why a patentee should get two bites at the ap
ple. If he or she could have included in the patent what is now alleged to be equivalent, and
did not, leading to a conclusion that an accused device lacks an equivalent to the disclosed
structure, why should the issue of equivalence have to be litigated a second time?"); Ken
neth R. Adamo, The Waiting at the (Patent) Bar ls Over - The Supreme Court Decides Hil
ton Davis, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 431 (1997), ("[A] second bite of the apple
under the [doctrine of] equivalents standard is both proper and allowed."); Clarence J.
Fleming, The Doctrine of Equivalents - Should It Be Available in the Absence of Copying?,
76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 233, 234 (1994) ("Under modem case law, the doc
trine of equivalents is thought of by practitioners and the courts as simply a second bite at
the apple for the patent owner in attempting to prove infringement."); Werner Sterner,
Note, The Doctrine of Equivalents After Hilton Davis and Markman, and a Proposal for
Further Clarification, 22 NOVA L. REV. 783, 798 (1998) ("[W]here an applicant for patent
limits his claims to avoid prior art, the applicant cannot later 'argue for a second bite at the
abandoned apple.'") (quoting Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1208 (Fed.
Cir. 1992)).
38. 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted).
39. An accused instrumentality will only infringe under the doctrine if, for each element
in a patent claim, the accused instrumentality has a corresponding equivalent element. See
Unique Concepts, 939 F.2d at 1562.

646

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:640

This difference between expanding the literal claim scope and ex
panding the right to exclude is subtle but of considerable consequence
because the doctrine of equivalents rests in delicate equipoise with the
patent claims' public notice function. The public notice function is the
principle, inherent in a claim based patent system, that the invention is
exactly what the claims says it is, and that members of the public can
avoid infringement by avoiding the claim language.40 The PTO and the
patentee serve the public notice function of a patent when they ce
ment the literal scope of the patent monopoly in the public record41 at
the time the patent issues. A patent monopoly right is the patentee's
quid pro quo for providing this disclosure to the public and enabling
subsequent innovation. Whenever the patent monopoly right expands
beyond the disclosure in the public record, the patent's public notice
function disintegrates because parties are entitled to rely on the public
record in order to make incremental innovations by building on or de
signing around the patented invention.42
The public's entitlement to rely on the public record only lias value
if potential competitors are able to determine where the patent mo
nopoly ends and free competition begins. It is for this reason that pat
ent law precludes a patentee from misusing a patent by expanding the
patent monopoly's scope with anticompetitive effect.43 This Note
therefore concludes that when a patent claimant is able to reference
an accused instrumentality during the claim construction phase of in
fringement litigation, the patent claimant may improperly expand the
patent's literal scope and thus vitiate the claims as a limitation on the
doctrine of equivalents. Where the doctrine of equivalents alone pro
vides merely a second bite at the apple, expanding the literal claim

40. Slimfold Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
The Federal Circuit's statements in Slim/old illustrate the public notice function:
The district court [was] overly concerned with the fact that the [accused instrumentality] was
deliberately designed to avoid infringement of the ... patent. Intentional 'designing around'
the claims of a patent is not by itself a wrong which must be compensated by invocation of
the doctrine of equivalents. Designing around patents is, in fact, one of the ways in which the
patent system works to the advantage of the public in promoting progress in the useful arts,
its constitutional purpose. Inherent in our claim-based patent system is also the principle
that the protected invention is what the claims say it is, and thus that infringement can be
avoided by avoiding the language of the claims.
Id.

41. The patent and its associated prosecution history make up the public record of the
patentee's monopoly rights.
42. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("The
claims, specification, and file history, rather than extrinsic evidence, constitute the public
record of the patentee's claim, a record on which the public is entitled to rely. In other
words, competitors are entitled to review the public record, apply the established rules of
claim construction, ascertain the scope of the patentee's claimed invention and, thus, design
around the claimed invention.").
43. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 92.
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scope during claim construction enables the patent claimant to swal
low the apple whole.
A patent claimant may successfully expand the literal claim scope
only by convincing the court to accept its claim construction conten
tions. The eventual finding on claim construction is a matter of law ex
clusively for the court,44 but the court draws its decision from the par
ties' contentions and the evidentiary record. As stated earlier, the
FRCP and the Local Rules govern the process by which the parties
perform the pretrial procedures that allow them to develop their con
tentions and gather evidence. The Local Rules also manage the proce
dure by which the parties prepare for the Markman hearing - a mini
bench trial in which the court arrives at a claim construction ruling.45
This Note asserts that, despite the Local Rules' popularity with courts
and commentators, in several aspects these rules improperly allow a
patent claimant the opportunity to expand the patent's literal scope.
This enables and encourages the patent claimant to proffer a strained,
litigation-inspired claim construction that amounts to patent misuse.
First, and most seriously, the mandatory disclosure procedure set out
by the Local Rules grants discovery of the accused instrumentality too
early in the claim construction process. Second, the Local Rules exac
erbate the problem introduced by this mandatory disclosure proce
dure by allowing a court too much leeway to rely on extrinsic evidence
to determine the scope of patent claims, despite the Federal Circuit's
hostility to the use of extrinsic evidence for such purposes.46 Finally, as
the ABA/IPL recognized, the Local Rules limit the court's ability to
implement different procedural rules to conduct discovery in a manner
that promotes justice in the particular case at hand.47 This prevents a
court from eliminating any opportunity for patent misuse introduced
by the mandatory disclosure procedure.
Specifically, Local Rule 3-4(a) requires that an accused infringer
disclose all information surrounding the accused instrumentality
before the patent claimant or the court engages in claim construction.48
After receiving that disclosure, the patent claimant may simultane
ously expand the scope of its asserted claim construction to ensure
44. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane); Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane), affd, 517 U.S. 370
(1996).
45. If a court utilizes a Markman hearing to resolve claim construction issues, the issue
of infringement, and hence application of the claims to the accused instrumentality, does not
occur until the full trial. Indeed, a court may never reach the issue of infringement because a
party that did not receive a favorable Markman ruling on claim construction may have a
greater incentive to settle.
46. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
see also infra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.

47. McAnn, supra note 2, at 293.
48. See infra note 59.
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that each disputed claim term is sufficiently broad to allow the claims
to read on the accused instrumentality, and avoid proposing a con
struction that might be so broad as to render the patent invalid in light
of the prior art.49 The Local Rules thereafter enable the patent claim
ant to support this expansive claim construction with evidence extrin
sic to the patent's public record.50 As a result, the public record fails to
effectively delineate the scope of the patent claimant's right to ex
clude. Instead, the patent claimant is able to create a new, litigation
inspired claim scope that is specifically honed to read on the accused
instrumentality. Thus, the Local Rules allow the patent claimant to
swallow the apple whole.
This Note argues that the Northern District of California should
restructure the Local Rules to avoid granting patent claimants the op
portunity to expand the patent's literal claim scope and to discourage
courts from relying on extrinsic evidence during claim construction.
Part I describes how the Local Rules can operate to encourage and
enable improper patent use. This Part further argues that, absent ex
treme circumstances, the Local Rules should bind the patent claimant
to the scope it has given to claim terms early in the discovery and
mandatory disclosure stages of litigation, before it has received any
disclosures related to the accused instrumentality. Part II argues that it
is often legal error for the Local Rules to allow a patent claimant to
delay asserting a claim construction until after it receives discovery
related to the accused instrumentality. This Part shows that the FRCP,
as applied to patent infringement litigation, favor early disclosure and
discovery of the patent claimant's claim construction, prior to any dis
closure regarding the accused instrumentality. Part III argues that
there are significant policy reasons why the Local Rules should bind a
patent claimant to its early claim construction statements and why a
court, prior to its claim construction ruling, should have the discretion
to limit a patent claimant's discovery of the accused instrumentality.
This Note concludes that early discovery of a patentee's claim con
struction, prior to any disclosures related to the accused instrumental
ity, is often necessary to discourage improper patent use. It may there
fore be an abuse of discretion for judges or local rules to allow a
patent claimant to delay answering interrogatories that seek the patent
claimant's claim construction assertions until after the patentee has
discovery of all information concerning the accused instrumentality.
This Note further concludes that the Local Rules' treatment of extrin
sic evidence encourages improper reference to the accused instrumen
tality during claim construction. The Local Rules should strictly and
49. N.D. Cal. L.R. 3-6(a) allows amendments to "Preliminary Infringement Conten
tions." See infra note 68. N.D. Cal. L.R. 3-7 allows additional amendments by order of the
court upon a showing of good cause. Id.
50. See infra Section LC.
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explicitly limit the court's use of extrinsic evidence during the claim
construction stage of infringement analysis.
I.

THE PATENT LOCAL RULES EXAMINED

Parties and the courts face certain informational disadvantages as
they seek to perform the claim construction step of patent infringe
ment analysis. For example, a patent claimant may require early ac
cess to information related to an accused instrumentality in order to
properly determine whether and how an opposing party is infringing
its patent. Additionally, in certain limited circumstances, a court may
find it necessary to examine extrinsic evidence in order to ensure that
it arrives at a claim construction ruling that is consistent with the un
derstanding of a person skilled in the art to which the patented inven
tion appertains. Certain procedural aspects of the Local Rules are
intended to ameliorate these difficulties, but these same procedures
also have the potential for significant deleterious effects.
Section I.A describes the mandatory disclosure procedure of the
Local Rules and shows how that procedure can result in substantial
prejudice to an accused infringer through its early demand for the dis
closure of all information related to the accused instrumentality. Sec
tion LB explains why a patent claimant's legitimate reasons for seek
ing early disclosure of all information related to the accused
instrumentality do not justify the Local Rules' mandatory disclosure
procedures. This Section further describes a preferred procedure that
would both discourage patent misuse and satisfy the patent claimant's
need for the information necessary to shape its infringement conten
tions. Section LC shows that the Federal Circuit is generally hostile to
the use of extrinsic evidence, including information concerning the ac
cused instrumentality, during claim construction. This Section asserts
that the Local Rules' procedures regarding extrinsic evidence do not
comport with Federal Circuit precedent.
A.

Improper Patent Use Under the Local Rules

An issued patent and its prosecution history make up the public
record of the patent monopoly awarded to the patentee.51 The patent
claims, cemented in the public record at the moment of issuance, de
fine the metes and bounds of the patentee's monopoly rights.52 Subse
quent inventors have the right to rely on the patent scope established
in the public record to create innovations that expand on or provide

51. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
52. Zenith Lab. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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alternatives to the patented invention.53 It is improper for a patentee
to use its patent to discourage legitimate innovation over the patented
invention and thereby discourage competition outside the scope of the
patent monopoly.54
This Section will demonstrate three mechanisms by which the Lo
cal Rules promote such improper patent use during infringement liti
gation. First, the mandatory disclosure procedures provide premature
access to all information concerning the accused instrumentality. This
premature access gives patent claimants the ability and incentive to
broaden the literal scope of their patent claims during claim construc
tion. Second, the Local Rules fail to impose a rigorous good faith
standard in amendments to the parties' proposed claim construction
statements. This allows the patent claimant to make bad faith amend
ments that expand the scope of their patent claims. Third, the Local
Rules contain an evidentiary exclusion that significantly inhibits an ac
cused infringer's ability to prove patent misuse.
The Local Rules set forth a system of specific procedures to con
trol the discovery and claim construction procedures in patent litiga
tion. After the initial case management conference held pursuant to
FRCP 26 (f) ,55 the Local Rules give the patent claimant ten days to
produce its "Disclosure of Asserted Claims and Preliminary Infringe
ment Contentions. "56 This initial disclosure by the patentee must, inter
alia, set out each patent claim that is allegedly infringed as well as the
specific identity of each instrumentality that allegedly infringes those
53. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
54. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1941) ("The public policy
which includes inventions within the granted monopoly excludes from it all that is not em
braced in the invention. It equally forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right
or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and which it is contrary to public pol
icy to grant."). But cf. 35 U.S.C § 271(d) (1994) ("No patent owner otherwise entitled to re
lief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having . . .
sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement.").
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) ("Conference of Parties; Planning for Discovery . . . the parties
must, as soon as practicable . . . confer to consider the nature and basis of their claims and
defenses and the possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the case, to make or
arrange for the disclosures . . . and to develop a proposed discovery plan. . . ).
"

56. N.D. Cal. L.R., supra note 3, at 3-1. Disclosure of Asserted Claims and Preliminary
Infringement Contentions:
Not later than 10 days after the Initial Case Management Conference, a party claiming pat
ent infringement must serve on all parties a "Disclosure of Asserted Claims and Preliminary
Infringement Contentions . . . contain[ing] the following information:
(a) Each claim of each patent in suit that is allegedly infringed by each opposing party;
(b) Separately for each asserted claim, each accused apparatus , product, device, process,
method, act, or other instrumentality ("Accused Instrumentality") of each opposing party
of which the party is aware. . . .
(c) A chart identifying specifically where each element of each asserted claim is found
within each Accused Instrumentality. . ..
(d) Whether each element of each asserted claim is claimed to be literally present or pre
sent under the doctrine of equivalents in the Accused Instrumentality . . . .
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claims.57 The most important aspect of this initial disclosure is a claim
chart, which sets out in detail where each element of each asserted
claim is found within each accused instrumentality, but does not con
tain a construction of those claims.58
Within forty-five days after the patent claimant's initial disclosure,
the accused infringer must disclose its preliminary invalidity conten
tions and produce all documentation sufficient to show the operation
of any aspects or elements of each accused instrumentality put in issue
by the patent claimant.59 At this time the Local Rules have not yet re
quired that the patent claimant construe any claim terms. Thus, the
Local Rules allow the patent claimant to assert which claims and ele
ments of claims it contends read on the accused instrumentality with
out constraining the patent claimant's ability to later assert a broader
or narrower claim scope as needed to prove infringement or avoid in
validity.
Within the next ten days, by day sixty-five since the initial case
management conference, both parties must exchange their "Proposed
Terms and Claim Elements for Construction."60 These are the claim
terms, phrases, and clauses that the parties contend the court should
construe at a Markman hearing. Twenty days later, the parties conduct
the "Exchange of Preliminary Claim Constructions and Extrinsic Evi
dence," in which both parties simultaneously assert their proposed
constructions of all disputed claim terms.61 Hence, after receiving dis
closure related to the accused instrumentality, the patent claimant has
thirty days before it must assert even a preliminary, nonbinding claim
construction.
By allowing the patent claimant to review all information related
to the accused instrumentality before it must construe the claims, the
57. N.D. Cal. L.R., supra note 3, at 3-l(a), (b).
58. Id. at 3-l(c).
59. Id. at 3-4. Document Production Accompanying Preliminary Invalidity Contentions:
With the "Preliminary Invalidity Contentions," the party opposing a claim of patent in
fringement must produce or make available for inspection and copying:

(a) Source code, specifications, schematics, flow charts, artwork, formulas, or other
documentation sufficient to show the operation of any aspects or elements of an Ac
cused Instrumentality identified by the patent claimant in its Patent L.R. 3-l (c)
chart; and . . . .
60. Id. at 4-1. Exchange of Proposed Terms and Claim Elements for Construction:
(a) Not later than 10 days after service of the "Preliminary Invalidity Contentions" pur
suant to Patent L.R. 3-3, each party shall simultaneously exchange a list of claim
terms, phrases, or clauses which that party contends should be construed by the
Court, and identify any claim element which that party contends should be governed
by 35 u.s.c. § 112(6) . . . .
61. Id. at 4-2 (stating that "the parties shall simultaneously exchange a preliminary pro
posed construction of each claim term, phrase , or clause which the parties collectively have
identified for claim construction purposes").
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Local Rules open the door for patent misuse because the patentee
may expand the scope of its patent with potentially anticompetitive ef
fect. 62 During the thirty days prior to the preliminary claim construc
tion exchange, the patent claimant can shape its claim construction
based on the disclosure it received regarding the accused instrumen
tality, thus ensuring that asserted claim terms are j ust broad enough to
cover the accused instrumentality and yet not so broad as to read on
any prior art. As a result, the patent claimant is assured that its as
serted claim construction reads on the accused instrumentality, while
simultaneously guarding against a construction that would render the
patent invalid as obvious or anticipated.63 Even patent litigation trea
tises encourage patent claimants to seize j ust such an opportunity to
expand the scope of the patent:
"Even though the patent owner will have identified a particular activity
as infringing in character prior to the initiation of the suit, " the patent
owner "should not overlook the possibility of other activities ... which
better support the case." Thus, plaintiffs should use discovery to request
"information concerning activities in an area as broad as any possible

scope of the patent in suit. "64

Notice that the patent claimant is encouraged, from the outset of
discovery, to assert a patent scope that is as broad as possible, regard
less of the patent claimant's good faith beliefs as to the actual scope of
the patent.
The Northern District of California has shown, through amend
ments to a proposed version of the Local Rules ("Proposed Local
Rules"), that it recognizes a patent claimant's ability to exploit the Lo
cal Rules in order to improperly broaden a patent's literal scope. In
the Proposed Local Rules, the patent claimant would file its "Final In
fringement Contentions" fifty days after it received the disclosures
related to the accused instrumentality.65 These Final Infringement
Contentions allowed the patent claimant to supplement its disclosure
of asserted claims, claim charts, and preliminary infringement conten
tions in light of the accused infringer's disclosures related to the ac
cused instrumentality.66 If, as this Note asserts, access to the accused
instrumentality raises the specter of patent misuse, then the Proposed
Local Rules had no provisions to ensure the propriety of these sup
plemented disclosures. Under this Note's theory, a supplementation in
62. This inhibits the Constitutional purpose of the patent system to encourage innova
tion through incremental technological advancements. See discussion infra Section III.A.
63. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
64. Alan H. MacPherson, Discovery and Motion Practice in Patent Litigation, 349
PLI/PAT 273, 280-81 (1992) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting 3 ROBERT A.
WHITE, PATENT LITIGATION: PROCEDURE & TACTICS§ 6.02(1], at 6-11 (1992)).
65. Proposed N.D. Cal. L.R. 3-4 (Sept. 18, 2000).
66. Id.
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the Final Infringement Contentions is proper where the patent claim
ant seeks to add infringement contentions that it could not have fath
omed before reviewing accused instrumentality disclosures. That same
supplementation is improper, however, if the patent claimant seeks to
use the insights it gained from the accused instrumentality disclosures
to add strained, litigation-inspired infringement contentions that ex
pand the scope of the patent beyond the literal language of the claims
and the marginal additional scope provided by the doctrine of
·
·
equivalents.67
·
·
In the final version of the 2001 Local Rules, perhaps realizing that
a patent claimant could use the Proposed Local Rules to improperly
expand the patent's literal scope, the Northern District added Local
Rule 3-6, which imposes a good faith requirement on the patent
claimant. Local Rule 3-6 makes the preliminary infringement conten
tions final unless the patent claimant believes "in good faith" that the
court's claim construction ruling or the disclosures related to the ac
cused instrumentality require an amendment to the preliminary con
tentions.68 It appears, then, that the Northern District recognized the
patent claimant's opportunity to improperly broaden its asserted claim
scope, and inserted the good faith requirement as a cure. But this good
faith requirement is too vague to discourage a patent claimant from
attempting to expand the literal claim scope. Rather than requiring a
mere a good faith belief that an amendment is in order, the Local
Rules should explicitly require that the patent claimant have a good
faith belief that its amendments do not improperly expand the patent's
literal scope. The Local Rules should affirmatively indicate that where
a court finds bad faith, it shall find the patent claimant guilty of patent
misuse69 and may certify the case as exceptional under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285,70 which would entitle the accused infringer to attorney's fees.
The Local Rules exacerbate this incentive for bad faith claim con
struction amendments through an evidentiary exclusion that deprives
a factfinder of highly probative evidence of patent misuse. Local Rule
67. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text; infra notes 75-76 and accompanying
text.
68. N.D. Cal. L.R., supra note 3 , at 3-6 (emphasis added). Final Contentions:
Each party's "Preliminary Infringement Contentions" and "Preliminary Invalidity Conten
tions" shall be deemed to be that party's final contentions , except as set forth below.
(a) If a party claiming patent infringement believes in good faith that (1) the Court's
Claim Construction Ruling or.(2) the documents produced pursuant to Patent L.R.
3-4 so requires, not later than 30 days after service by the Court of its Claim Construc
tion Ruling , that party may serve "Final Infringement Contentions" without leave of
court that amend its "Preliminary Infringement Contentions" with respect to the in
formation required by Patent L.R. 3-l(c) and (d). . . .
69. A patent claimant may be liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for multiplying the pro
ceedings in the case "unreasonably and vexatiously." See Automated Bus. Cos. , Inc. v. NEC
Am. , Inc. , No. 4:98-CV-619-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20962 , at *11 (N.D. Tx. Feb. 8 , 1999).
70. See Automated Bus. Cos. , 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20962, at *12.
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2-4 precludes admissibility of the "proposed terms and claim elements
for construction" and "preliminary claim construction statement" un
less admitted in connection with motions seeking a modification to the
Local Rule's timetable.71 This evidentiary exclusion hinders the ac
cused infringer's ability to show that the patent claimant has
attempted to expand the patent's literal scope and completely deprives
the accused infringer of the ability to show bad faith in the patent
claimant's Local Rule 3-6 amendments to its preliminary infringement
contentions. Absent the exclusion, an accused infringer could show the
patent claimant's improper patent expansion or bad faith by intro
ducing evidence that the patent claimant has asserted a broader claim
construction in its final infringement contentions than it asserted in an
earlier claim construction. Such evidence would be especially proba
tive because the broader claim construction follows the disclosures
related to the accused instrumentality.
The Northern District has shown, through previous amendments
to proposed versions of the Local Rules, that it recognizes the poten
tial for improper claim scope expansion during claim construction. Yet
the current version of the Local Rules still prescribes procedures that
give patent claimants an incentive to broaden the literal scope of their
patent claims during litigation. These procedures give patent claimants
the opportunity to tailor their claim construction contentions to fit the
accused instrumentality and simultaneously limit the accused
infringer's ability to admit evidence of this type of patent misuse.
B.

Meeting the Need for Disclosure While Avoiding Misuse

A patent claimant may have legitimate reasons for seeking early
disclosure of the accused instrumentality. Prior to bringing suit, the
patent claimant may be unable to obtain a device that it has a good
faith belief infringes its patent because the device is prohibitively ex
pensive or because the accused infringer will not sell such a device to
its known competitor. In other cases, the patent claimant may hold a
process patent and have only a good faith belief that the accused
infringer is manufacturing products using the patented method or pro
cess. In such cases, the patent claimant may have little actual knowl
edge of infringement because the accused infringer is maintaining its
manufacturing method or process as a trade secret. In these situations,
a patent claimant requires access to the allegedly infringing instrumen
tality before it can determine whether and how its patent is infringed.

71. N.D. Cal. L.R., supra note 3, at 2-4 ("[Proposed Terms and Claim Elements for
Construction, Preliminary Claim Constructions, and Preliminary Identifications of Extrinsic
Evidence] are not admissible for any purpose other than in connection with motions seeking
an extension or modification of the time periods within which actions contemplated by the
Patent Local Rules must be taken." ) .
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Section LB demonstrates that the Local Rule procedures can meet the
patent claimant's need for early discovery of information related to
the accused instrumentality while still limiting the · potential for patent
misuse.
FRCP 1 1 requires a plaintiff to develop enough facts to support a
cause of action before filing a complaint.72 In the patent
infringement context, Rule 1 1 prohibits a patentee from filing a patent
infringement suit in hopes that later discovery will uncover proof of
infringement.73 Thus, before filing a complaint, the patent claimant
must first satisfy itself that one or more of its patent claims were
infringed. That infringement determination will entail the two-step
process of first construing the claims and then applying the claims to
the accused instrumentality.74 Hence, in order to satisfy Rule 11, the
patent claimant must have at least some contentions regarding the
scope of its patent and at least some intimation of the accused instru
mentality's composition.
Although discovery may later be necessary to determine precisely
which, if any, of the patent claims read on the accused instrumentality,
the Local Rules should require that the patent claimant first disclose
at least the initial claim construction for the claims it presumed to be
infringed when it filed the complaint. An absence of specific informa
tion regarding the accused instrumentality does not relieve the pat
entee or the court of its responsibility to construe the patent claims
without reference to the accused instrumentality;75 nor does such an
72. FED. R. Civ. P. ll(b). Representations to Court:
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a
pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying
that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances, (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause un
necessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; the claims, defenses, and
other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous ar
gument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establish
ment of new law;
(2) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifi
cally so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportu
nity for further investigation or discovery; and
(3) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so
identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
Id.

73. See Automated Bus. Cos., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20962, at *9; see also infra Section
II.A.
74. See Automated Bus. Cos. , 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20962, at *9; see also infra Section
II.A.
75. Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(stating that the patentee "argues that 'degradable' must first be construed based on the 266
patent documents, without reference to the accused device" (internal citations omitted));
Young Dental Mfg. Co. v. Q3 Special Prods., Inc., 112 F.3d 1137, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("[T)he claim scope is determined without regard for the accused device."); Scripps Clinic &
Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("In 'claim con-
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absence render them incapable of doing so. A patent claimant
asserting that it is unable to proffer an initial claim construction at the
outset of litigation could not possibly have satisfied the requirements
of Rule 11. After receiving the patent claimant's initial claim construc
tion, the accused infringer can subsequently disclose information and
documentation concerning the accused instrumentality.76 This disclo
sure will give the patent claimant the information it needs either to
further shape its infringement contentions or to drop the suit after
finding that there is no infringement under the claim scope it originally
asserted.
This scheme will require the patent claimant to divulge its initial
claim construction at the outset of litigation. The patent claimant can
later alter its proffered claim construction as it gains more information
concerning the accused instrumentality. But such a scheme will dis
courage patent misuse only if the patent claimant is bound in some
manner by the claim scope it initially asserts. The Local Rules should
inhibit the patent claimant from later asserting a claim construction
that expands the scope of a claim beyond any construction that the
patent claimant has already proffered. In order to prevent a patent
claimant from making an initial claim construction contention that is
overbroad, the Local Rules should also inhibit the patent claimant
from later asserting a narrower claim scope in order to avoid a finding
that the patent is invalid in light of the prior art. After a patent claim
ant has gained access to disclosures related to the accused instrumen
tality, the only claim construction adjustments the Local Rules should
allow are those that will either proffer a construction of claim terms
that were not previously addressed or assert that a different or addi
tional set of claims apply to the accused instrumentality. The Local
struction' the words of the claims are construed independent of the accused product, in light
of the specification, the prosecution history, and the prior art. Of course the particular ac
cused product (or process) is kept in mind, for it is efficient to focus on the construction of
only the disputed elements or limitations of the claims. However, the construction of claims
is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim language: in order to understand and
explain, but not to change, the scope of the claims."). Contra ROBERT L. HARMON,
PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 5.6(g) at 230 n. 354 (4th ed. 1998) (arguing that in
certain circumstances claim construction cannot proceed without reference to the accused
instrumentality). Note that in Multiform the patentee, rather than the accused infringer, was
arguing for a claim construction without reference to the accused instrumentality. The dis
trict court below had first looked to the specification and prosecution history before reach
ing a conclusion on the proper definition of a claim term. The Federal Circuit approved of
the district court's decision to state its final definition of the disputed term in light of the ac
cused instrumentality as a mere "expedient" to efficient resolution of the issue in litigation.
133 F.3d at 1477-78.
76. When a patent claimant suffers from a dearth of pre-litigation information regarding
infringement, a court could require accused instrumentality disclosures prior to the initial
claim construction only to the extent necessary to allow the patent claimant to determine
which claim elements are arguably present in the accused instrumentality. The patent claim
ant then need only construe the claim terins describing those allegedly infringed claim ele
ments.
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Rules should only allow the patentee to construe claim terms it
neglected to construe in its initial disclosure if the patent claimant first
convinces the court that it could not reasonably have known the claim
or claim term would be in issue prior to examining disclosures related
to the accused instrumentality. Finally, the Local Rules should allow
an accused infringer to use a change in claim scope as evidence of pat
ent misuse or bad faith by the patentee in making its Local Rule 3-6
claim construction amendments or to show cause why the court should
certify the case as exceptional under 35 U.S.C § 285.
This Note does not assert that a court should entirely prohibit
early discovery of all information concerning the accused instrumen
tality. Nor does it assert that a court should require a patent claimant
to produce a final and complete claim construction statement before
the patent claimant has access to any information concerning the ac
cused instrumentality.77 Rather, this Note asserts that 1;l court should
force the patent claimant to disclose the preliminary claim construc
tion that the patent claimant .must have developed in order to satisfy
Rule 11, and that a court should give binding effect to the scope of
that early preliminary construction. Furthermore, a court should allow
accused infringers the opportunity to show patent misuse by allowing
offering evidence that a patent claimant has proffered a final claim
construction statement that differs in scope from its preliminary claim
construction contentions.
C.

Extrinsic Evidence Under the Local Rules

After the PTO has published an issued patent or a pending patent
application, a member of the public may obtain that published disclo
sure in order to determine the scope of the patent and design a com
peting device that avoids infringement. Extrinsic evidence78 is not
available to third parties as they seek to make this determination. The
Federal Courts have shown that they are loathe to allow a patent
claimant to rely on extrinsic evidence to establish the scope of a patent
because a claim construction based on evidence unavailable in the
public record would undermine the public notice function of the pat
ent disclosure.79 A quote from the Federal Circuit is illustrative:
In those cases where the public record unambiguously describes the
scope of the patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is im-

77. Although in certain circumstances that may be desirable, such as when there are par
ticular concerns that discovery will lead to the disclosure of the accused infringers trade se
crets or where it would have been particularly easy for the patent claimant to gain access to
the required information without resorting to the discovery process.
78. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
79. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also
Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, No. 3:00cv524, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10990, at *12-19
(E.D. Va. 2001).
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proper. The claims, specification, and file history, rather than extrinsic
evidence, constitute the public record of the patentee's claim, a record on
which the public is entitled to rely. In other words, competitors are enti
tled to review the public record, apply the established rules of claim con
struction, ascertain the scope of the patentee's claimed invention and,
thus, design around the claimed invention.80

This Section will first outline the Local Rules' procedure by which the
parties submit claim construction related extrinsic evidence. This Sec
tion will then demonstrate that this procedure is antithetical to the
Federal Circuit's hostility to claim construction determinations that
rely too heavily on extrinsic evidence.
Under the Local Rules' procedure, the parties must together file a
"Joint Claim Construction Statement" within the 1 1 5 days following
the initial case management conference.81 This statement contains,
inter alia, the claim constructions on which both parties agree,82 each
party's construction of any claim terms on which the parties disagree,
and an enumeration of all evidence, both intrinsic and extrinsic,83 that
each party intends to rely on in support of its asserted claim construc
tion. 84 By day 145, the parties must have completed all discovery re 
lated to claim construction,85 and by day 155, the patent claimant must
serve and file an opening brief along with "any evidence" supporting
its claim construction.86 If the parties or the Court believe a claim con
struction hearing is necessary, the court will subsequently hold a
Markman hearing sometime between 176 and 190 days from the initial
case management conference.87 The Joint Claim Construction State80. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.
81. N.D. Cal. L.R., supra note 3, at 4-3.
82. Id. at 4-3(a) (stating that the joint statement shall contain " [t]he construction of
those claim terms, phrases, or clauses on which the parties agree").
83. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
84. N.D. Cal. L.R., supra note 3, at 4-3(b) (requiring that the joint statement shall con
tain "[e]ach party's proposed construction of each disputed claim term, phrase, or clause,
together with an identification of all references from the specification or prosecution history
that support that construction, and an identification of any extrinsic evidence known to the
party on which it intends to rely either to support its proposed construction of the claim or to
oppose any other party's proposed construction of the claim, including, but not limited to, as
permitted by law, dictionary definitions, citations to learned treatises and prior art, and tes
timony of percipient and expert witnesses.").
85. Id. at 4-4 ("Not later than 30 days after service and filing of the Joint Claim Con
struction and Prehearing Statement, the parties shall complete all discovery relating to claim
construction. . . ).
"

86. Id. at 4-5(a) ("Not later than 45 days after serving and filing the Joint Claim Con
struction and Prehearing Statement, the party claiming patent infringement shall serve and
file an opening brief and any evidence supporting its claim construction.").
87. Id. at 4-6. ("Subject to the convenience of the Court's calendar, two weeks following
submission of the reply brief specified in Patent L.R. 4-5(c), the Court shall conduct a Claim
Construction Hearing, to the extent the parties or the Court believe a hearing is necessary
for construction of the claims at issue.").
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ment and evidence supporting the opening brief amount to an open
call for extrinsic evidence supporting the patent claimant's claim con
struction. To the court's chagrin, the patent claimant may attempt to
use this extrinsic evidence at the ensuing Markman hearing to broaden
the scope of the patent beyond the clear limits imposed by the intrinsic
evidence.88
These ·procedures enable the patent claimant and the court to use
extrinsic evidence, including the accused instrumentality, during claim
construction in a manner that is contrary to Federal Circuit precedent.
In Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc. , the Federal Circuit ruled that
it was improper for a court to rely on extrinsic evidence during claim
construction when the intrinsic evidence alone could resolve any
ambiguity present in a disputed claim term.89 The court noted that the
specification is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term,
followed closely by the prosecution history.9()
The Federal Circuit subsequently limited the Vitronics decision in
Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co. ,91 where the court stated,
"Vitronics merely warned courts not to rely on extrinsic evidence in
claim construction to contradict the meaning of claims discernible
from thoughtful examination of . . . the intrinsic ·evidence."92 As a re
sult, the Pitney Bowes court found that "it is entirely appropri
ate . . . for a court to consult trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure
that the claim construction it is tending to from the [intrinsic evidence]
is not inconsistent with clearly expressed, plainly apposite, and widely
held understandings in the pertinent technical field."93
Two factors serve to narrow the Pitney Bowes court's discussion of
the proper use of extrinsic evidence during claim construction. First,
this language in the Pitney Bowes decision was merely a reaction to
the Supreme Court's opinion in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,94
where the Court stated that " [t]he trial judge must have considerable
leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining

88. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, No. 3:00cv524, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10990, at
*12-19 (E.D. Va. 2001) (finding "disturbing" the patent claimant's tendency to "distance its
current constructions from what the inventors said in making the claims and explaining the
inventions in the specification, and, in so doing, to use the claim construction process to
broaden claims rather clearly not made in the intrinsic evidence.").
89. 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir 1996) ("In those cases where the public record unambi
guously describes the scope of the patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is
improper.").
90. Id. at 1582.
91. 182 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
92. Id. at 1308.
93. Id. at 1309 (alteration in original).
94. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

660

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:640

whether particular expert testimony is reliable."95 Hence, despite its
expansive language, the Pitney Bowes analysis regarding extrinsic evi�
dence was particularly directed at expert testimony and has little rele
vance in determining the propriety of claim construction with refer
ence to an accused instrumentality or any other extrinsic evidence.
Second, the district court judge in Pitney Bowes had not relied on
extrinsic evidence to construe the claims.96 Instead, it had "referred
only briefly to the extrinsic evidence, which it quite properly exam
ined, in discussing a collateral argument made by Pitney Bowes."97 On
appeal of the trial court's decision, the Federal Circuit's analysis fo
cused primarily on allowing the district court j udge the discretion to
examine expert testimony as a means to shore up its knowledge in the
relevant technical field and to determine the meaning of a term ac
cording to one "skilled in the art" as the patent statutes require.98
Thus, the Federal Circuit never expressly sanctioned a factfinder's re
liance on extrinsic evidence for claim construction. It only approved
reference to extrinsic evidence in order to inform the factfinder of the
content and level of skill in the relevant technical art.
So in essence, Pitney Bowes merely encourages courts to exercise
discretion in receiving extrinsic evidence, and particularly expert tes
timony, for three purposes: (1) to supply the proper technological con
text in which to interpret the claims; (2) to ensure that the claim con
struction it arrives at conforms to the understanding of one skilled in
the art; and (3) to help the trial court understand the patent process
itself.99 Therefore, the Local Rules should affirmatively limit the par
ties' ability to submit extrinsic evidence to the court by requiring that
the parties have a good faith belief that each submission is solely for
the purpose of satisfying one of the three Pitney Bowes purposes.
Moreover, for each piece . of extrinsic evidence submitted, the Local
Rules should require that the submitting party specifically indicate
which of the Pitney Bowes purposes that evidence is meant to serve.
Although the Local Rules should allow the parties to submit ex
trinsic evidence in the form of expert testimony, inventor testimony,
dictionaries, technical treatises, and articles to satisfy the Pitney Bowes
purposes,100 the accused instrumentality, which is also extrinsic evi
dence, should never be admitted as evidence during claim construe-

95. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added) discussed in Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d
at 1308 n.2.
96. Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1309 ("[W]e do not doubt the district court's express
statements that it did not rely on extrinsic evidence in its claim construction.").
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
99. Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1314 (Rader, J., additional views).
100. Id. at 1308.
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tion. Putting the substantial prejudice to the accused infringer and the
Federal Circuit's clear directives to exclude the accused instrumental
ity from claim construction aside,101 the Local Rules should also ex
clude the accused instrumentality from evidence during claim con
struction because it simply fails to serve the Pitney Bowes purposes.
First, the "proper technological context in which to understand the
claims" cannot be the context of the accused instrumentality. Such a
definition would cause the court to expand the patent scope to cover
the accused instrumentality as a matter of course. Rather, it means the
technological context of the invention and the background and scien
tific field of the patent in suit.102 Second, technical dictionaries and
prior art documents are sufficient to evidence "the understanding of
one skilled in the art" to which the patent appertains. In the rare case
that they are not,103 testimony by the inventor and other experts
knowledgeable in the field would be the logical and linguistically
proper means to evidence the understanding of one skilled in the art.
The accused instrumentality is a poor guide to the semantics of the
patent claims because until and unless it is found to infringe, it may be
a separate invention - an expansion on, or alternative to, the level of
understanding common in the pertinent technical field. A person
skilled in the art is "presumed to be one who thinks along the lines of
conventional wisdom in the art and is not one who undertakes to in
novate. "104 If the accused instrumentality were allowed to guide the
court in its determination of the knowledge of one skilled in the art,
infringement would be a foregone conclusion because the court would
first have to presume that the creator of the accused instrumentality
was not "one who undertakes to innovate," but instead someone who
undertakes to copy or merely use the "conventional . wisdom."105
Finally, there is simply no reasonable basis for any assertion that the
101. See supra notes 62-63, 75 and accompanying text.
102. Anderson v. Int'! Eng'g & Mfg., Inc., 160 F.3d 1345, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Dic
tionary definitions of ordinary words are rarely dispositive of their meaning in a technologi
cal context. A word describing patented technology takes its definition from the context in
which it was used by the inventor.").
103. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating
that instances where ambiguity cannot be resolved through the use of intrinsic evidence
alone will rarely, if ever, occur).
104. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also
HARMON, supra note 7, § 4.3(a) 129. But see Gould v. Hellwarth, 472 F.2d 1383 (C.C.P.A.
1973) (explaining that one skilled in the art is generally a highly trained person knowledge
able in the field and aware of the relevant prior art).
105. In addition, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is partially focused on
known interchangeability - whether one skilled in the art would know to substitute a claim
element for an alternative element used in the accused instrumentality. See Litton Sys., Inc.
v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[K]nown interchangeability is of
ten synonymous with equivalence."). If the accused instrumentality dictated the knowledge
of one skilled in the art, then elements of the accused instrumentality would by definition be
interchangeable.
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accused instrumentality could inform the court of intricacies of the
patent application process. After all, the accused instrumentality may
never have been the subject of a patent application.
Due to the accused instrumentality's lack of utility as extrinsic evi
dence, the Local Rules should allow judges the discretion to limit dis
covery of the accused instrumentality prior to claim construction. Al
though the Local Rules' mandatory disclosure procedures do . not
appear to allow an accused infringer to seek a limiting order that ex
cludes the accused instrumentality from discovery prior to a Markman
hearing,106 the Federal Circuit has expressly held that such limiting or
ders may be proper. In Vivid Technologies v. American Science & En
gineering Inc. , the district court judge required the early resolution of
claim construction issues without allowing discovery concerning the
accused instrumentalities.107 In reviewing the decision, the Federal
Circuit held that it is within the discretion of a district court to deny a
patent claimant discovery of the accused instrumentality prior to claim
construction.108 Consequently, a court may properly exclude an ac
cused instrumentality from evidence prior to a Markman hearing and
an accused infringer may properly seek a limiting order that excludes
the accused instrumentality from discovery.
A synthesis of the Vitronics, Pitney Bowes, and Vivid Technologies
cases reveals that a court should postpone the admission and discovery
of any extrinsic evidence until the court finds as a preliminary matter
that it is unable to resolve the ambiguity of a claim term by examining
the intrinsic evidence alone. Hence, the Local Rules should explicitly
require the parties first to limit the body of evidence to intrinsic mate
rial and then to submit only that extrinsic evidence that will serve the
Pitney Bowes purposes. In the extremely rare occasion that a court
finds itself unable to determine the scope and meaning of a claim term
using intrinsic evidence alone,109 it may expand its examination of ex
trinsic evidence to prior art documents, dictionaries, and possibly ex
pert testimony, but never to the accused instrumentality.U0

106. See N.D. Cal. L.R., supra note 3, at 2-5. The rule does not include the accused in
strumentality among the enumerated categories of potentially objectionable discovery re
quests.
107. 997 F. Supp 93, 95 (D. Mass. 1997), affd in relevant part, vacated in part and re
manded, 200 F.3d 795 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
108. 200 F.3d at 804.
109. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating
that instances where ambiguity cannot be resolved through the use of intrinsic evidence
alone will rarely, if ever, occur).
1 10. Id. ("Even in those rare instances (where extrinsic evidence is needed], prior art
documents and dictionaries, although to a lesser extent, are more objective and .reliable
guides. Unlike expert testimony, these sources are accessible to the public in advance of liti
gation.").
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SUPPORT FROM THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

To this point, this Note has asserted that the Local Rules' manda
fory disclosure procedures promote improper patent use, primarily by
requiring the accused infringer to produce accused instrumentality
disclosures before requiring the patent claimant to construe the patent
claims. This Note has also asserted that the Local Rules promote im
proper patent use by failing to impose strict limitations on the submis
sion and examination of extrinsic evidence prior to and during claim
construction hearings. Part II will demonstrate that the Local Rules'
mandatory disclosure procedures are not aligned with the FRCP,
which tend to favor early disclosure of the patent claimant's claim con
struction. Section II.A shows that because FRCP 11 's pre-filing inves
tigation requirement forces the patent claimant to form a claim con
struction prior to filing suit, the Local Rules should ordinarily require
the patent claimant to disclose a preliminary claim construction with
its initial disclosures. Section 11.B asserts that trial judges should often
compel early answers to FRCP 33(c) interrogatories seeking a patent
claimant's claim construction contentions.
A.

Rule 11 Pre-filing Investigation

In View Engineering v. Robotic Vision Systems, the Federal Circuit
held that Rule 11 requires that a law firm "at a bare minimum, apply
the claims of each and every patent that is being brought into the law
suit to an accused device and conclude that there is a reasonable basis
for a finding of infringement of at least one claim of each patent so
asserted."111 Essentially, View Engineering requires the patent claim
ant to perform an "infringement analysis"112 before filing suit where it
at least: (1) determines the meaning and scope of each term of one or
more patent claims, re. construe the claims, and (2) concludes that one
or more of the claims so construed reads on the accused instrumental
ity.113 Thus, a patent claimant could not have a reasonable belief that
an accused instrumentality infringes without first having construed
and applied the claims.
The Local Rules' mandatory disclosure procedures do not comport
with this requirement. Local Rule 2-5 allows a patent claimant to ob
ject to discovery requests seeking to elicit either its claim construction
position or a comparison of the asserted claims to the accused instru111. 208 F.3d 981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
l 12. Id.
1 13. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text; see also Judin v. United States, 1 10
F.3d 780, 784-85 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that "[d]etermining infringement . . . requires that
the patent claims be interpreted and that the claims be found to read on the accused de
vices" and imposing Rule 11 sanctions on a patent claimant's attorney for failing to perform
these steps prior to filing suit).
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mentality on the grounds that the requests are premature in light of
the timetable set up by the Local Rules.114 This timetable currently al
lows the patent claimant to delay such claim construction assertions
until after it has received accused instrumentality related disclo
sures.115 But in order to satisfy the stringent requirement of View En
gineering, the patent claimant must have already formed at least a
preliminary claim construction before filing its complaint. Therefore,
it does not need further discovery of all information related to the ac
cused instrumentality before it discloses at least an initial claim con
struction statement.
To comport with Rule 11, the Local Rule 3-1 Day 10116 disclosure
could also require that the patent claimant disclose a preliminary set
of proposed claim terms for construction and a preliminary construc
tion of those terms along with its preliminary infringement contentions
and claim chart. But given the complex nature of patent infringement
litigation it is difficult to maintain a per se rule requiring early disclo
sure of the patent claimant's claim construction along with its in
fringement contentions. In fact, the ABA/IPL criticized the Local
Rules for this sort of stringent control of the discovery process.117 In
stead, the Northern District . of California should adjust the Local
Rules so that patent claimants no longer may refuse to provide early
answers to claim construction related discovery requests as a matter of
course.
B.

Rule 33(c) Construction Interrogatories

A proper adjustment would allow judges to give more serious con
sideration to compelling early answers to an accused infringer's con
tention interrogatories that. seek the patent claimant's claim construc
tion assertions ("construction interrogatories") where such
interrogatories are appropriate. Although Rule 33(c)118 on its face
grants a judge the discretion to delay a response to contention inter-

1 14. N.D. Cal. L.R. 2-5 ("A party may object, however, to responding to the following
categories of discovery requests . . . on the ground[] that they are premature in light of the
timetable provided in the Patent Local Rules . . . (a) Requests seeking to elicit a party's
claim construction position; (b) Requests seeking to elicit from the patent claimant a com
parison of the asserted claims and the accused apparatus, product, device, process, method,
act, or other instrumentality. . . .").
1 15. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (explaining that the Local Rules re
quire accused instrumentality related disclosures on day 55, while delaying claim construc
tion assertions until day 85 since the initial case management conference).
116. See supra note 56.
117. McCann, supra note 2, at 293 ("[I]t is unlikely that a clear majority of IPL Section
members or a significant number of district courts would agree to such detailed discovery
procedures.").
1 18.

FED.

R. Clv. P. 33(c).

December 2001]

Improper Patent Use

665

rogatories until the end of discovery or later,119 the Northern District
provided guidance as to the scope of this discretion in In re Conver
gent Technologies.12° In Convergent, the court favored delaying an
swers to contention interrogatories until the close of discovery121 but
set guidelines for determining when earlier answers might be neces
sary. Applied to patent infringement litigation, these guidelines indi
cate that construction interrogatories deserve and require an early re
sponse.
The Convergent court expressly recognized the need for early
answers to at least some contention interrogatories in certain factual
settings.122 The court concluded that Rule 33(c) and the Advisory
Committee Notes accompanying the 1970 amendments to the FRCP
did not create a formal presumption in favor of delaying answers to
contention interrogatories until the end of discovery.123 The court
stated that it would not preclude entirely the early use of contention
interrogatories, but would place a burden of justification on the serv
ing party:124 (1) the party must handcraft a limited set of questions; and
(2) the party must show that there is good reason to believe the an
swers will contribute meaningfully to clarifying the issues in the case,
narrowing the scope of the dispute, or setting up early settlement dis
cussions, or that such answers will likely expose a substantial bases for
a motion under either FRCP 11 or 56.125
Assuming the accused infringer handcrafts its construction inter
rogatories, they will by nature meet the Convergent requirements.
1 19. "An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable merely be
cause an answer to the interrogatory involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or
the application of law to fact, but the court may order that such an interrogatory need not be
answered until after designated discovery has been completed or until a pre-trial conference or
other later time. " FED. R. CIV. P. 33(c) 'l[2 (emphasis added).
120. 108 F.R.D. 328 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (providing a full treatment of contention inter
rogatories and timing thereof).
121. Id. at 334 ("While [Rule 33(c) and the Advisory Committee Notes] probably do not
go so far as to create a formal presumption in favor of not compelling responses to conten
tion interrogatories until the end of the discovery period, they certainly invite courts to give
active consideration to the wisdom of ordering such a postponement of answers to these
kinds of interrogatories.").
122. Id. at 336 ("[T]here may be situations in which . . . important interests would be
advanced if answers were provided early to at least some contention interrogatories.").
123. See supra note 121.
124. Id. at 338 ("[T]his court believes that the wisest course is not to preclude entirely
the early use of contention interrogatories, but to place a burden of justification on a party
who seeks answers to these kinds of questions before substantial documentary or testimonial
discovery has been completed.").
125. Id. at 338-39; see also Brown v. United States, 179 F.R.D. 101 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)
(contention interrogatories are often deferred until the end of discovery unless the request
ing party can show "how an earlier response assists the goals of discovery such as exposing a
substantial basis for a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 56."); Braun Med., Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., 155 F.R.D. 525, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
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First, if the patent claimant has satisfied the Rule 11 pre-filing investi
gation requirement set forth in View Engineering, then the patent
claimant must have already engaged in claim construction and applica
tion of the claims to the accused instrumentality.126 Hence, the patent
claimant does not need additional discovery in order to provide
answers to contention interrogatories on this subject. An accused
infringer may then argue that the patent claimant must either provide
answers to construction interrogatories or show cause why the court
should not dismiss the case and grant a motion for Rule 11 sanc
tions.127 Second, if the court will not allow the patentee to expand the
scope of an earlier asserted claim construction,128 then answers to
claim construction interrogatories will establish the outermost metes
and bounds of the patent, which will narrow the issues for trial and
enable the accused infringer to shape its noninfringement argu
ments.129 Finally, a well-reasoned response to such an interrogatory

126. See supra Section II.A.
127. Rule l l (c) allows a court to impose sanctions on a party and its attorneys for not
performing a reasonable pre-filing inquiry to ensure that, inter alia, the complaint is not be
ing maintained for any improper purpose, that the claims are warranted, and that the allega
tions have evidentiary support. Fed. R. Civ. P. ll(c).
128. The procedural scheme propounded in Part I supra.
129. Courts, commentators, and practitioners have often asserted that resolving claim
construction issues prior to trial will narrow the issues in the subsequent litigation. See, e.g.,
Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng'g Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15143, at *6 (E.D.N.C. June 22,
1998) ("Defendants assert that a pretrial construction of the claims by the court will signifi
cantly narrow the issues for trial. . . ."); Mediacom Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d
17, 22 (D. Mass. 1998) ("Questions regarding the construction of patent claims can now
safely be addressed in many circumstances prior to the completion of fact discovery, and cer
tainly before trial. In this case, the Court determined that an early Markman hearing was a
salutary mechanism for narrowing the disputed issues and securing prompt disposition of
those matters as to which there were no factual disputes."); Mark L. Austrian & Shaun
Mohler, Timing Is Everything in Patent Litigation - Fulfilling the Promise of Markman, 9
FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 230 (1999) (asserting that early resolution of claim construction conten
tions "narrow(s] the issues for both pre-trial and trial proceedings."); Kimberly M. Ruch
Alegant, Note, Markman: In Light of De Novo Review, Parties to Patent Infringement Liti
gation Should Consider the ADR Option, 16 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 307, 308 (1998)
(resolving claim construction pretrial through alternative dispute resolution would narrow
the issues for trial and save the parties' time and money); cf. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v.
Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 857 (D. Del. 1995) (noting the efficiency of "early
resolution of the claim construction issue."). Early answers to claim construction related in
terrogatories both narrow and clarify the issues for trial because claim construction is often
the central issue in an infringement suit and often takes on case-dispositive significance. See,
e.g. , EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157 F.3d 887, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("resolution
of most of a complex infringement case with no more trial than a two-day (claim construc
tion) hearing."); Adamo, supra note 5, at 602 (explaining that claim construction is the "focal
point" of infringement litigation); Robert C. Weiss et al., MARKMAN PRACTICE,
PROCEDURE AND TACTICS, PLI Order No. GO-OOBN Patent Litigation 2000, 619 PLI/Pat
1 17 (Oct. 2000) ("In view of the decisions in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., and
the more recent decisions of the Federal Circuit, the issue of claim construction has taken on
paramount significance, often of case dispositive nature. Indeed, the Federal Circuit charac
terized claim construction as 'the central issue of nearly every patent appeal.' ") (quoting
Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1 109, 1114 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
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may convince the infringer of the strength of the patent claimant's
case and hence encourage settlement of the dispute.
The Northern District should harmonize the Local Rules with the
FRCP by recognizing the patent claimant's duties under Rule 11 and
allowing the use of contention interrogatories in a manner consistent
with Rule 33(c ). Contention interrogatories seeking a patent claim
ant's claim constructions need not be delayed until the patent claimant
has had adequate opportunity to examine the accused
instrumentality because it is well settled law that the accused instru
mentality is neither necessary to formulate a claim construction nor
properly relied on for that purpose.130 Additionally, a court need not
delay answers to a handcrafted set of contention interrogatories seek
ing a patentee's claim construction because such interrogatories meet
the requirements of Convergent: narrowing and clarifying the issues
for trial, potentially encouraging settlement discussions, and poten
tially exposing a basis for a motion seeking summary judgment under
Rule 56 or sanctions under Rule 11.
III. POLICY PERSPECTIVES
This Note has previously explained how the Local Rules' proce
dures allow a patent claimant to expand the scope of its patent during
litigation. This Section points out how such an extended monopoly
right threatens both the constitutional foundation of patent law and
the public policies that shape the patent system. Section III.A demon
strates that patent law policy does not favor the patentee and nor
should patent litigation procedures. Section 111.B discusses the role of
the patent disclosures as a public record of the invention and explains
how the improper use of extrinsic evidence subverts this role.

130. See, e.g., View Eng'g, Inc. v. Robotic Sys., 208 F.3d 981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (inter
preting Rule 11 to require at least a preliminary claim construction before the suit is even
filed); Young Dental Mfg. Co. v. Q3 Specialty Prods., Ince, 112 F.3d 1 137, 1 141 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (stating that "the claim scope is determined without regard for the accused device");
Jurgens v. McKay, 927 F.2d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (same); Scripps Clinic & Research
Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("in 'claim construction' the
words of the claims are construed independent of the accused product, in light of the specifi
cation, the prosecution history, and the prior art"). But cf. Scripps Clinic & Research Found.
v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Of course the particular accused
product (or process) is kept in mind, for it is efficient to focus on the construction of only the
disputed elements or limitations of the claims. However, the construction of claims is simply
a way of elaborating the normally terse claim language: in order to understand and explain,
but not to change, the scope of the claims."). The Scripps Clinic analysis comports with this
Note's view that the Local Rules may properly allow early discovery of the accused instru
mentality only to the extent necessary to determine which claim terms are in issue. See supra
note 76 and accompanying text.
·
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Symmetry in the Law, Asymmetry in the Courts

A patent owner is not favored under the . law and consequently
should not be favored during patent infringement litigation. The social
value of patent law does not lie merely in its ability to protect the
rights of a patentee to his or her invention. Rather, the quid pro quo
of the patent statutes provides the patentee with a limited monopoly
right in exchange for public disclosure of the invention.131 The pat
entee is recompensed for its expenditures in developing the invention
while the public receives valuable knowledge from the patent specifi
cation, which reveals how to make and use the patented invention.
Hence, the social value of patent law lies in its ability to use the patent
monopoly and its associated public disclosure as a tool to encourage
incremental innovation and investment in research and develop
ment.132 But patents also impose social costs in the form of reduced
levels of competition in the market for the patented invention.133
Because an optimal patent system encourages innovation while limit
ing the encumbrance of this social cost on society, the rights of the ac
cused infringer are at least equal to, and may slightly outweigh, the
right of a patentee to its limited monopoly.134 As a result, the law
should seek to avoid any asymmetry in rules governing patent litiga
tion.
Unfortunately, patent litigation contains an intrinsic information
asymmetry favoring the patent claimant:
The moment a patent suit is filed, the plaintiff has already accumulated
and developed most of what is needed for the plaintiff's case. The patent
plaintiff has already obtained and examined the allegedly infringing de
vice, along with data books and other information about the defendant's
product. The patent plaintiff has thus already developed its contentions
about infringement .. .thus entering litigation with the foundation of its
entire case intact . . . . In contrast, patent defendants often begin litigation with an enormous information deficit. ...Beyond a good-faith belief
in non-infringement, the defendant has not had the opportunity to de
velop its contentions ... the defendant sometimes may have no way of
knowing what information will be needed to prove invalidity, non

infringement or other defenses.135

131. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
132. HARMON, supra note 75, § 1.2 at 11 ("The exclusive right, Constitutionally derived,
was for the national purpose of advancing . . . technological innovation.").
133. Id. at 12 (describing the costs of the right to exclude, including "inflated costs (in
variably absorbed by the consumer) . . . and overinvestment").
134. Id. at 11 ("The patent system seeks to maintain an efficient balance between incen
tives to create and commercialize and the public costs engendered by those incentives.").
135. MacPherson, supra note 64, at 318-19.
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In effect, this information asymmetry has become mandatory due to
the Federal Circuit's interpretation of Rule 11,136 requiring a patentee
to develop its contentions about infringement, including its claim con
struction and application to the accused instrumentality, before filing
suit.
The Local Rules enhance this asymmetry by requiring immediate
production of all documents tending to support the patentee's posi
tion, including information concerning the accused instrumentality.137
The patentee thus has early access to an even greater amount of in
formation and is then able to adjust its claim construction to cover the
accused instrumentality without having ever disclosed its earlier and
potentially more limiting claim construction.138 Because the social poli
cies behind patent law do not favor the patentee over the public, the
Local Rules should not heighten the information asymmetry inherent
in patent infringement litigation.
B.

The Public Notice Doctrine

The Local Rules' permissive procedures for the introduction of ex
trinsic evidence contravene the Federal Circuit's constitutionally
grounded hostility to the use of extrinsic evidence for claim construc
tion purposes. The quid pro quo for awarding the patentee a limited
monopoly in the subject matter of its invention is the creation of a
public record of the invention.139 This public disclosure is the device by
which Congress encourages innovation as required by the Constitu
tion.140 The court stated in Vitronics tha.t "competitors are entitled to
review the public record, apply the established rules of claim construc
tion, ascertain the scope of the patentee's claimed invention and, thus,
design around the claimed invention."141
136. See supra Section II.A.
137. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
138. See supra Section I.A.
139. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974) (characterizing "disclo
sure" as the "the quid pro quo of the right to exclude").
140. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec
tive Writings and Discoveries.").
141. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd
on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Industries, Inc., 932 F.2d
1453 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir.
1985) ("The incentive to 'design around' patents is a positive result of the patent system.");
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. R EV .
1177, 1239; Peter K. Schalestock, Equity for Whom? Defining the Reach of Non-Literal Pat
ent Infringement, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 323, 335 ("By identifying slight improvements in
patents that only just escape the language of the claims, inventors make small, incremental
advances in technology that are critical to long-term progress."). Note also that if rights re
quire justification, then by implication those rights must be subordinate to other concerns.
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If a district court or party could alter the public record through the
use of extrinsic evidence, such as an accused instrumentality, intro
duced at a claim construction proceeding or during trial, the right of
the public to design around would be meaningless.142 This right is at
the basis of the constitutional authority granting Congress the right to
legislate patent law.143 If patent monopolies are continually expanded
during infringement litigation, incremental innovation will be chilled
because a fear of liability will discourage potential inventors from ex
amining and designing around a patent that may prove to be broader
in scope than· what the potential inventor can possibly ascertain from
the public record. The fear that the benefits of their labor will eventu
ally accrue to a patentee when their new technology is found to in
fringe an existing patent will discourage the public from investing in
further technological advances in the area pertinent to the patented
invention.144
As an analytical framework when ruling on the proper interpreta
tion of patent claims, the Federal Circuit has analogized a patent to a
statute.145 In keeping with this analogy, expansion of the patent during
litigation, beyond the scope disclosed by the public record, would
make an accused infringer subject to an ex post facto law. This is
harclly a novel comparison. Thomas Jefferson, who wrote more on the
subject of the patent law than did any other founding father,146 recog
nized that a grant of patent rights in ideas in the public domain "was
akin to an ex post facto law 'obstructing[ing] others in the use of what
they possessed before.' "147 When the Local Rules allow the patent
claimant to expand the patent monopoly during litigation, they de
prive the public, and the accused infringer, of property - the use of
142. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583 (citing Southwall Tech., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d
1570, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
143. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
144. Schalestock, supra note 141, at 335-36 ("Encouraging inventors to design around
patents is one of patent law's most important goals, a goal that is fully supported by the Fed
eral Circuit. By identifying slight improvements in patents that only just escape the language
of the claims, inventors make small, incremental advances in technology that are critical to
long-term progress. . . . If inventors cannot be certain that staying outside the language of
claims protects them from infringement actions, they will not risk modest advances. Tech
nological progress is thwarted as a result. This result would directly contravene the constitu
tional purpose of the patent system, which is to 'promote the progress of . . . the useful
arts.' ").
145. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en bane), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (finding that the statutory interpretation, which as a
matter of law is for a court to decide, is the more appropriate analogy for interpreting patent
claims than a contractual interpretation analogy).
146. Edward C. Walterscheid, The Use and A buse of History: The Supreme Court's
Interpretation of Thomas Jefferson's Influence on the Patent Law, 39 IDEA 195, 198 (1999).
147. Id. at 214; see also id. at 215 (noting that Jefferson acknowledged that the constitu
tional prohibition on ex post facto laws applied only to criminal law but argued that "they
are equally unjust in civil as in criminal cases").

December 2001]

Improper Patent Use

671

technology in the public domain - without ever having provided the
quid pro quo of establishing a public record. Returning again to the
statute analogy, the resulting prejudice to the accused infringer is akin
to a procedural due process violation - depriving the accused
infringer and the public of property in the public domain without
relying on a properly enacted statute.
As this Section has shown, where the Local Rules enable patent
scope expansion during litigation, they undermine the basic goal of
patent law - to promote the progress of the useful arts. Potential
innovators, unable to determine reliably the bounds of patents by re
viewing the public disclosures and fearful of litigation where the Local
Rules will disfavor them, are discouraged from attempting technical
advances that may expose them to liability.
C ONCLUSION

By requiring early disclosure of all information related to the ac
cused instrumentality, by allowing bad faith adjustments to the patent
claimant's preliminary infringement contentions, and by excluding
preliminary claim construction contentions from the evidentiary rec
ord, the Local Rules encourage and enable the patent claimant to im
properly expand its monopoly to the detriment of the public and the
accused infringer. The Local Rules thus allow the patent claimant to
deprive the public of their constitutional right to design around the
patent and discourage potential innovators from pursuing incremental
advances over the patented technology for fear that the patent claim
ant may broaden the patent scope during trial. The Local Rules preju
dice an accused infringer because they allow a patent claimant to en
force an amorphous patent that broadens in order to read more
closely to the accused instrumentality as discovery progresses.
To resolve these issues, the Local Rules should bind a patent
claimant to a preliminary claim construction that it asserts at the out
set of infringement litigation in response to the accused infringer's
construction interrogatories. The Local Rules should prohibit the pat
ent claimant from broadening the scope of this preliminary claim con
struction in order to ensure that the claims read on an accused instru
mentality. Furthermore, to keep the patent claimant from asserting a
strained, overly broad initial claim construction, the Local Rules also
should prohibit the patent claimant from narrowing the preliminary
claim construction in order to avoid the prior art.
A court's use of extrinsic evidence during patent litigation may re
sult in a claim construction that varies from the public record of the
patent monopoly. Hence, the Local Rules' receptive attitude to extrin
sic evidence is detrimental to the rights of potential innovators who
seek to rely on the public record. The Local Rules should expressly
limit the types of extrinsic evidence that the parties may offer to evi-
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dence that will serve either to supply a proper technological context to
understand the claims, to ensure that the claim construction the court
arrives at conforms with the understanding of one skilled in the art, or
to help the trial court understand the patent process itself. The Local
Rules also should adopt procedures to ensure that the parties and the
courts do not rely on extrinsic evidence in the first instance, but rather
seek first to arrive at a claim construction from intrinsic evidence
alone.

